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Conflict of Laws - Enforcement of Wrongful Death Cause of
Action Arising in Another State-Although the death resulted from
an automobile collision in Illinois, plaintiff, as administrator, brought
this action in Wisconsin against the allegedly negligent driver and an
insurance company basing his complaint upon the Illinois wrongful
death statute.' The decedent, the administrator of his estate appointed
in Wisconsin, and the individual defendant were Wisconsin residents,
and the defendant insurance company was incorporated in Wisconsin.
The Wisconsin wrongful death statute2 is typical of the wrongful death
acts but concludes as follows: "provided, that such action shall be
brought for a death caused in this state." On the defendant's motion,
the Circuit Court of Milwaukee entered summary judgment "dismissing
the complaint on the merits," and held that the Wisconsin statute es-
tablished a local public policy against Wisconsin's entertaining suits
brought under the wrongful death acts of other states. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court' affirmed this decision and the plaintiff appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. Held: Reversed. Since the Illinois
statute has been established as a "public act," Wisconsin's expressed
statutory policy is contrary to the national policy embodied in the full
faith and credit clause of the constitution. Wisconsin, under the full
faith and credit clause, cannot avoid the constitutional obligation to
enforce the rights and duties validly created under the laws of other
states by the simple devise of removing jurisdiction from courts other-
wise competent. Hughes v. Fetter et al., 341 U.S. 609, 71 S.Ct. 980
(1951).
The real issue and problem is how far the full faith and credit clause
governs the conduct of the state's domestic affairs. When must the
forum deny its own law and policy and follow that of another state?
The broad principle, stated in an earlier case,4 that a state may refuse to
open its courts for the enforcement of actions arising under the laws
of other states, has been qualified in subsequent cases.- It is basic that
the power of a state to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its
courts and the character of the controversies which shall be heard
therein is subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal Con-
stitution6 The contract clause, the privileges and immunities clause,
1 SMITH-Husw'S ILL. ANN. STAT. (1951) c. 70, §§1, 2.
2 WIS. STAT. (1949) Sec. 331.03.
3 Hughes v. Fetter et al., 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W.(2d) 452 (1950).4 Anglo-American Prov. Co. v. Davis Prov. Co., 191 U.S. 373, 24 S.Ct. 92,
48 L.Ed. 225 (1903).
5 Alaska Packer's Ass'n. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532,
55 S.Ct. 518, 79 L.Ed. 1044 (1935); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc.
Commission, 306 U.S. 493, 59 S.Ct. 629, 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939).
6 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 S.Ct. 589, 79 L.Ed. 1100 (1935);
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the full faith and credit clause, all fetter the freedom of a state to deny
access to its courts howsoever much it may regard such withdrawal of
jurisdiction the adjective law of the state, or the exercise of its right to
regulate the practice and procedure of its courts. The dissenting opin-
ion, which cannot be overlooked in this five to four decision, limits the
extent to which a state must recognize and enforce the rights of action
created by other states to where the liability imposed rests on a pre-
existing relationship and where certainty of result is of high importance.
But such a concise rule cannot be formulated upon a review of this
case and other United States Supreme Court decisions.
The Supreme Court, in the present case, reaffirmed the principle
"that the full faith and credit clause does not automatically compel a
forum state to subordinate its own statutory policy to a conflicting pub-
lic act of another state; rather, the United States Supreme Court will
choose in each case between the competing public policies involved." As
a result this case does not obligate the forum to open its courts to all
foreign causes of action or even those lying in the field of torts. The
state may, in appropriate cases, apply the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens.7 However, the Wisconsin policy cannot be considered as an
application of this doctrine because its use results in a denial to enforce
the public acts of other states. The state may also, without violating
the Federal Constitution, refuse to enforce a cause of action, except
one arising from a valid judgment of a sister state, where the forum's
local policy denies such a cause if the same facts had occurred within
the state." But Wisconsin has no real feeling of antagonism against
wrongful-death suits in general,9 since it provided a forum for cases of
this nature, precluding only actions for deaths not caused locally. In
fact, the Wisconsin Supreme Court entertained an action of almost the
exact nature and facts as the present case, holding that "citizens of
other states have the same right to sue in the courts of Wisconsin that
citizens of Wisconsin have."'01 The comment on this case by the Wis-
consin court is that the full content of the Wisconsin wrongful death
statute was not given full consideration." However, the case is sig-
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 54 S.Ct. 640, 78 L.Ed. 1227
(1934).
7 Supra, note 4.
8 "The present case is not one where Wisconsin, having entertained appellant's
lawsuit, chose to apply its own instead of Illinois' statute to measure the
substantive rights involved. This distinguishes the present case from the rule
that prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own
statutes, lawfully enacted." Note 10 of principal case.
9 "The differences between wrongful death acts, notably as to matters of maxi-
mum recovery and disposition of the proceeds of suit, are generally considered
unimportant. Cases collected in 77 A.L.R. 1311, 1317-1324." Note 11 of principal
case.
LO Sheehan v. Lewis et al., 218 Wis. 588, 260 N.W. 633 (1935).
11 Supra, note 3.
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RECENT DECISIONS
nificant in that it does indicate the Wisconsin court's desire to allow the
survival of wrongful death suits when unaware of any limitations.
At the common law, no civil action would lie for wrongfully caus-
ing the death of a human, although the wrongful act might, under some
circumstances, give a right of action to others arising out of some rela-
tion existing between the deceased and the plaintiff. 2 The unjustness
of this law was recognized and changed in England and Wisconsin in
the latter's infancy. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 3 quickly recog-
nized that the statute was a remedial one, and should be construed, not
strictly, but so as to advance the remedy, and suppress the wrong and
injustice existing under the former condition of the law.13 However,
Wisconsin did not show the same alacrity in rooting out all of the in-
justice. The primary or underlying reason for the Wisconsin legisla--
ture to limit survival actions to those deaths caused in Wisconsin, and
the Wisconsin court's obedience to its command, appears to be to avoid
imposing on the forum a "state of vasalage" and to reduce the case
load. To thus lessen the burdens of the Wisconsin courts is unquestion-
ably a desirable situation. However, where Wisconsin would be the
only jurisdiction where service could be had on the defendant, sur-
vivors would be left with unenforceable wrongful death claims.
A solution to this problem, and the incondite statute of Wisconsin,
is a comparatively recent Illinois statute 4 which was found to be con-
stitutional by the United States Court of Appeals.' 5 The Illinois statute
provides that no action shall be brought in Illinois to recover damages
for death occurring outside Illinois where a right of action for such
death exists under the laws of the place where the death occurred and
service of process in such suit may be had on the defendant in such
place. In light of the United States Supreme Court's repeated declara-
tion that "the full faith and credit clause is not an inexorable and un-
qualified command" and that, consistently with its proper application,
"there are limits to the extent to which the laws and policy of one state
may be subordinated to those of another," this is a permissible limita-
tion on the full faith and credit clause. This statute recognizes the
validity and enforcibility of the wrongful death statutes of sister states,
and provides for their enforcement in the courts of Illinois in the event
they cannot be enforced in the courts of the state which enacted them.
The added burden on the courts is slight. In fact, the dissenting opinion
in the principal case maintained it would be an exceptional case "where
the defendant could not be served in the state where the accident oc-
curred."
12 COOLEY ON TORTS, Sec. 210 (4th ed., 1932).
13 Rudiger v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R. Co., 94 Wis. 191,
68 N.W. 661 (1896).
14 SMITH-HuRD's ILL. ANN. STAT. (1951) c. 70, §2.
15 First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 190 F.2d 493 (7th cir., 1951).
1952]
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A change of the Wisconsin statute is overdue, and, in effect, now
ordered by the Supreme Court. The state is not completely free to de-
termine to what extent its courts shall entertain transitory actions,
where the causes of action arise in other jurisdictions. Under the con-
situtional limitation imposed by the full faith and credit clause, the Su-
preme Court has limited the area in which local policy is permitted to
dominate. The room left for the play of conflicting policies of sister
states narrows.
ARTHUR J. SCHMID, JR.
Labor Law -The Right to Membership in a Union Holding a
Closed Shop Contract - Plaintiff was a lifelong resident of Toledo
and a motion picture operator by trade, but was unable to obtain em-
ployment since all employers in the area were under closed shop con-
tracts with the defendant union, which refused to accept plaintiff as a
member. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant to restrain it from
interfering with him in securing a position as an operator and, further,
that defendant be required to accord plaintiff all right of membership
in the union. Held: The union was restrained from interfering with
plaintiff in securing a position; the court holding that a union cannot
arbitrarily restrict its membership so as to deprive men of the right to
earn a livelihood. Seligman v. Toledo Moving Picture Union, Local
228, et al., 98 N.E. (2d) 54, (Ohio, 1947).*
Early decisions on the right of trade unions to restrict their mem-
bership resulted in the "country club" theory that the admission of new
members was entirely within the discretion of the union, and that the
courts could not force another man's company on the group.' Refusal
of an injunction was also based on the theory that there was no prop-
erty right that equity could enforce, for such membership involved only
a personal right.2 An allegation that he could not otherwise obtain work
did not aid one plaintiff, but there no closed shop contracts were al-
leged.3 Under closed shop fact situations the courts were more willing
to grant relief, finding a property right which could be enforced to pro-
tect the right to earn a livelihood. The principal case made reference
to the United States and Ohio constitutions in finding a property right
to pursue a lawful calling, which right the court placed ahead of the
right to union security. 5 But a recent Massachusetts case held that
* Although this case was decided in 1947, it was not published until 1951.
1 Baird v. Wells, 44 Ch. Div. 661, 59 L.J. Ch. 673 (1890).
2 Frank v. National Alliance of Bill Posters, 89 N.J.L. 380, 99 A. 134 (1916).
3Feinne v. Monahan, 196 Misc. 407, 92 N.Y.S. (2d) 112 (1949).
4 Seligman v. Toledo Moving Pictures Operators Union, Local 228, et. al., 98
N.E. (2d) 54, (Ohio, 1947).
5 "It seems to me necessarily to follow that the union must either surrender
its monopoly or else admit to membership all qualified persons who desire
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